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United States v. Waste Industries: Federal
Common Law and Imminent Hazards
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I) recognized a cause of action based on federal common law of nuisance2 as an exception to the Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkinss doctrine that there is no federal general common law. 4 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 11)5
the Court reevaluated its earlier decision and held that the
1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA),' which completely revised the Act soon after Milwaukee I, displaced the previously available federal common
law action.' The application of the preemption standard of
Milwaukee 11s to other environmental statutes is not entirely
1. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
2. Federal common law of nuisance has its origin in the early twentieth century.
See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U.S. 496 (1906). See also Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and the Federal
Common Law of Nuisance: A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 7 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. 41 (1983).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This landmark decision held that state and not federal law
supplies the substantive standards in diversity actions in federal court. The Court
stated: "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a State .... And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts." Id. at 78.
4. The Supreme Court has fashioned federal common law where there is "an
overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the
controversy touches basic interests of federalism. . . ." 406 U.S. at 103-07 & n.6.
5. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). See Note, Milwaukee v. Illinois: An Interstate Water
Pollution Dispute, 1 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 50 (1983).
6. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511376 (1982)).
7. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 3, 22 (1981) (For the majority, Justice Powell wrote that the Court in Milwaukee
I had held that "the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution
control is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the [FWPCA].").
8. "The question whether a previously available federal common-law action has
been displaced by federal statutory law involves an assessment of the scope of the

1

1984]

U.S. V. WASTE INDUSTRIES

straightforward.
One area of substantial uncertainty, solid and hazardous
waste disposal, is governed by two federal statutes: the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 9 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 10 RCRA authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to establish a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory scheme to control the generation," transportation,"
treatment, storage and disposal's of solid and hazardous
waste. CERCLA was enacted to address the problem of cleaning up inactive or abandoned 4 solid and hazardous waste disposal sites.' 5 CERCLA authorizes EPA to undertake remedial
action with respect to actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances into the environment which may present "an
imminent and substantial danger to public health or wellegislation and whether the scheme established by Congress addresses the problem
formerly governed by federal common law." 451 U.S. at 315 n.8.
9. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 93
6901-6987 (1982)) amended by The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat. 3221) 5576 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987). RCRA was designed to eliminate "the last
remaining loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes." H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 4,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6238, 6241. For a discussion of
RCRA's legislative history, see Kovacs & Klucsik, The New Federal Role in Solid
Waste Management: The Resource Conservationand Recovery Act of 1976, 3 Colum.
J. Envtl. L. 205, 216-20 (1977).
10. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982)).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 6922.
12. Id. § 6923.
13. Id. §§ 6924, 6925.
14. "The distinction between abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites lies in
the continuing ownership of the latter. A dump site has been abandoned when its
owners and operators no longer maintain a relationship with it.... A site which the
current owner controlled while it was used for waste disposal is an inactive site."
United States v. Waste Indus., 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 n.5 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (order
granting motion to dismiss), rev'd, 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
15: In the legislative history subsequent to the enactment of RCRA, Congress
discussed the need for further legislation: "Since enactment of [RCRA], a major new
source of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic consequences of improperly
[sic], negligently [sic], and recklessly [sic] hazardous waste disposal practices known
as the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem.'. . . Existing law is clearly inadequate
to deal with this massive problem." H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 17-18,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6119, 6120.
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fare.""6 EPA is also authorized under CERCLA to sue designated classes of persons to reimburse the fund for costs incurred while performing these remedial operations. 17 Finally,
both RCRA and CERCLA contain imminent hazard provisions pursuant to which EPA may bring suit in federal district
court for injunctive relief to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.18
Before the Supreme Court decided Milwaukee II, two
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). The functions vested in the President by section
106(a) are delegated to the Administrator of EPA. Exec. Order No. 12316, 46 Fed.
Reg. 42,237, 42,238 (1981).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). See infra note 99.
18. RCRA section 7003 states, in pertinent part:
[Ulpon receipt of evidence that the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate
district court to immediately restrain any person contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to stop such handling,
storage, treatment, transportation or disposal or to take such other action as
may be necessary ...
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a).
In 1984 Congress amended section 7003 to specify that an action may be brought
under the provision to remedy conditions resulting from past completed acts:
[U]pon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-

ment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the
appropriate district court against any person (including any past or present
generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of
a treatment, storage or disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to
restrain such person from such handling, storage, treatment, transportation
or disposal, to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both. ...
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
CERCLA section 106(a) states, in pertinent part:
[Wihen the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a
facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United States to secure
such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the district court of the United States in the district in which the threat occurs shall
have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of
the case may require. .

..

42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
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federal district courts19 held that the imminent hazard provision in RCRA, section 7003, is solely jurisdictional and applied federal common law of nuisance substantive standards
of liability. 20 Since Milwaukee II, however, the federal courts

have been reluctant to apply federal common law principles in
the area of solid and hazardous waste disposal. The district
court opinion in United States v. Waste Industries2' typifies
this reluctance. Holding that RCRA preempts federal common law of nuisance, the district court nonetheless explored
the availability of federal common law of nuisance as a source
of substantive law.22 The district court concluded that the
preemption of federal common law in the area of solid and
hazardous waste disposal is "complete and total" and that the
federal courts must look to sources other than federal com23
mon law for section 7003 substantive standards of liability.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit validated the district
court's preemption analysis, but rejected its reasoning and
reached a different result. 24 Relying on the legislative history

of the 1980 Amendments to RCRA,25 the circuit court found

19. United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery (Midwest Solvent), 484 F. Supp.
138, 143-44 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (order granting motion for preliminary injunctive relief);
United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. (Solvents Recovery), 496 F. Supp. 1127,
1133-34 (D. Conn. 1980) (order denying motions to dismiss).
20. Solvents Recovery concluded that the application of federal common law was
justified by the "sufficiently strong federal interest in preventing and abating groundwater pollution caused by the disposal of hazardous wastes, and in having a uniform
body of federal law governing controversies involving such pollution..
" as evidenced by the legislative history and statutory provisions of RCRA. 496 F. Supp. at
1138. But see infra note 62. Solvents Recovery rejected the defendant's contention
that a necessary condition of a federal common law of nuisance claim to abate pollution of any kind is an interstate effect, i.e., pollution having its origin in one state and
its effect in another. 496 F. Supp. at 1134-39. See Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
619 F.2d 623, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1980). Cf. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1107-08 (D. Minn. 1982) (order denying motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, wherein the court refused to limit
section 7003 to ground water pollution having interstate effects).
21. 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
22. Id. at 1316 n.29.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). See infra notes
71-78 and accompanying text.
25. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,
1984 U.S. Cede Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat. 3221) 5576 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
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that Congress incorporated and expanded upon federal common law principles of nuisance in section 7003 as part of the
substantive standards of liability.2 Holding that federal common law of nuisance standards apply to section 7003 except to
the extent that section 7003 expands upon those standards,
the circuit court concluded that Milwaukee II is not inconsis27
tent with this result.
The decision in Waste Industries marks the first attempt
by a circuit court to apply the holding of Milwaukee II to
RCRA section 7003. This note discusses the preemption of
federal common law by RCRA and CERCLA, and the application of federal common law principles to the imminent hazard
provisions of those Acts. It concludes that the Fourth Circuit's
holding that federal common law standards of liability apply
to section 7003 is the better view, but that the circuit court's
reasoning is flawed.
II.

Background

There is a split among the federal courts on the question
of whether RCRA section 7003 is merely a jurisdictional provision granting EPA the authority to bring suit or a substantive provision against activities that may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment.28 The distinction between a
substantive and a jurisdictional statute is that a substantive
statute is one that creates liability, and a jurisdictional statute
is one that authorizes remedies or proceedings but does not
create liabilities.2 " If section 7003 is solely jurisdictional, a
source of substantive standards by which to apply that section
must be found. Federal common law of nuisance is a possible
source."0 If section 7003 contains substantive standards of lia6901-6987). See infra note 36.
26. 734 F.2d at 167.
27. Id.
28. No court has held that the analogous imminent hazard provision
CLA, section 106(a), is solely jurisdictional. See infra note 97.
29. See United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54, 55
1982) (order denying motion to dismiss).
30. Those standards may also be found in other provisions of RCRA
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act. See Solvents Recovery, 496

in CER(N.D. Ill.
or in the
F. Supp.
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bility, it would appear that the need for federal common law
is displaced. 1
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee H,
three courts held that section 7003 is merely a jurisdictional
grant to EPA and does not confer substantive liability.3 2 One
court applied section 7003 substantively without deciding the
issue expressly, 33 and another held that section 7003 is both
jurisdictional and substantive.3"
In United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery (Midwest
Solvent) 35 the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana considered whether section 7003 imposes substantive
standards of liability. After reviewing both the "sketchy" legislative history3 6 and the structure3 7 of the Act, the district
1127, 1134 (D. Conn. 1980).
31. But see Waste Industries, 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984). See infra notes
71-78 and accompanying text..
32. Midwest Solvent, 484 F. Supp. 138, 143-44 (N.D. Ind. 1980); Solvents Recovery, 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v. Ottati & Gross,
Inc., No. 80-225-L (D.N.H. Oct. 20, 1980) (order denying motion to dismiss).
33. United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 885 (E.D. Ark. 1980)
(order granting motion for preliminary injunctive relief).
34. United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329,
1332 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 1981) (order denying motion for summary judgment).
35. 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
36. The only reference to section 7003 in the legislative history contemporaneous
with its passage is found at H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprintedin
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6238, 6308, wherein it is merely reiterated that
EPA "may bring suit in the United States District Court, for appropriate relief."
Since all prior major environmental statutes have included emergency provisions similar to section 7003 - Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (i)(a) (1982); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (1982) - section 7003 was probably included in RCRA as a matter of course and without considerable thought. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1311 (E.D.N.C. 1982); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823,
835 n.6 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
37. First, the court observed that section 7003 is placed among the "miscellaneous" provisions of RCRA and not in the subchapter that set forth duties under the
Act. Second, the court noted that section 7003 is preceded by a "citizen suit" provision which confers standing upon any person, not including the United States, to sue
to enforce the Act. The immediate proximity of those provisions is further evidence
that section 7003 does not create tests of substantive liability. Third, the court noted
that section 7003 is worded so broadly that it is unlikely that Congress intended section 7003 to serve as a liability creating provision. Finally, the court observed that
other sections of RCRA establish standards of conduct for the disposal of hazardous
waste. 484 F. Supp. at 143-44.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss1/6

6

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

court held that section 7003 merely confers jurisdiction upon
the federal district courts and standing upon EPA where the
"evidentiary tests" of "an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment" are satisfied.3 8 The
district court found that in determining whether preliminary
injunctive relief should be granted the federal courts must apply both common law principles and the Federal Rules of
39
Civil Procedure.
The District Court of Connecticut in United States v.
Solvents Recovery Services of New England (Solvents Recovery)40 also held that section 7003 is solely jurisdictional. The
district court noted that although, in an appropriate case,
standards of liability might be found in other provisions of
RCRA or the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act,
federal common law of nuisance is the source of any substantive right which the United States may have in cases regarding groundwater pollution."
A different view was implied in United States v. Vertac
Chemical Corp.42 In Vertac the District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas applied section 7003 substantively without expressly addressing the issue of whether section 7003 is
solely jurisdictional or both jurisdictional and substantive.
The district court held that the escape of dioxin from a waste
site into nearby navigable waters constitutes an "imminent
and substantial endangerment" within the meaning of section
7003, 43 and granted injunctive relief to alleviate the condition.
44
Finally, in United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp.
the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reviewed
both Midwest Solvent and Vertac and concluded that section
7003 is both jurisdictional and substantive in nature. 45 The
38. Id. at 143-44.
39. Id. at 143.
40. 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980) (Note that the relief sought in Midwest
Solvent was a preliminary injunction, and that the relief sought here was a permanent injunction).
41. Id. at 1134.
42. 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
43. Id. at 884-86.
44. 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 1981).
45. Id. at 1332.
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district court held that section 7003 provides jurisdiction to
grant injunctive relief where a hazardous waste presents an
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment" within the meaning of section 7003.46
Since Milwaukee II, only one court has held that section
7003 is solely jurisdictional. That court is the District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina in Waste Industries.47 Three courts have applied section 7003 substantively
without addressing the issue expressly, 8 and two courts, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Waste Industries, have explicitly found that section 7003 contains both
substantive and jurisdictional elements. 9
III.
A.

United States v. Waste Industries

The Facts and The District Court's Decision

Before 1968, New Hanover County, North Carolina did
not have a solid waste disposal program or facility. 50 Waste
was disposed of on private property. In 1968, the county contracted with the city of Wilmington to use its landfill site.
That landfill, however, proved inadequate for the county's
46. Id.
47. 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982), rev'd, 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). See
infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
48. United States v. Price (Price I), 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981) (order denying petition for preliminary injunctive relief and motion for summary judgment, except with respect to plaintiff's cause of action based on federal common law of nuisance which was dismissed with prejudice and holding that the defendant was
"contributing to" the "disposal" of hazardous waste resulting in an endangerment
within the meaning of section 7003), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982); NEPACCO,
579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (order pursuant to a motion for declaratory judgment and holding that the defendant was not contributing to the "disposal" of hazardous waste resulting in an endangerment within the meaning of section 7003);
Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (order denying motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim and holding that the complaint was
sufficient to establish an "imminent and substantial endangerment" within the meaning of section 7003).
49. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1434-35 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (order
denying motion to dismiss); Waste Industries,734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984). See
infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
50. The discussion of the facts is based on the circuit court's summary of the
district court's findings. Waste Industries, 734 F.2d 159, 161-63 (4th Cir. 1984).
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needs. In an effort to alleviate its disposal problem, the
county in 1972 granted Waste Industries an exclusive license
to establish and operate landfills for the disposal of solid
waste generated within the county.
Waste Industries acquired several landfill sites, including
a seventy-acre site in Flemington. A lease from private owners
granted Waste Industries sole use and control of the premises.
Waste Industries situated the landfill in a hole created by the
removal of sand. Solid and hazardous waste buried at the site
began leaching through the permeable sandy soil into the
groundwater acquifer below.
Flemington area residents first noticed in 1977 that their
well water had become foul in color, taste and smell. Tests
conducted by EPA confirmed groundwater contamination.
Analysis revealed many toxic, organic, and inorganic chemicals, including known carcinogens, and established the improper disposal of waste at the Flemington landfill as a source
of contamination. On June 30, 1979, Waste Industries' permit
to use the landfill was withdrawn. Although Waste Industries
has ceased operations at the landfill and the site has since remained inactive, the leaching and migration of contaminants
will continue indefinitely unless remedial action is taken.
EPA brought suit under RCRA section 7003 to abate the
leaching of hazardous chemicals from the Flemington landfill.
In its initial complaint, EPA requested both preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief. When federal, state, and local
governments jointly funded a permanent safe water supply,
EPA withdrew its request for preliminary relief. EPA continued, however, to demand a plan to prevent further contamination, to restore the groundwater, to monitor the site and to
reimburse EPA for monies expended to clean up the site.
On motion to dismiss EPA's complaint for failure to state
a cause of action, the District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina held that section 7003 is solely jurisdictional."
51. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1982), rev'd, 734 F.2d
159 (4th Cir. 1984). Accord Midwest Solvent, 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (preMilwaukee II decision holding section 7003 is solely jurisdictional). See supra notes
35-39 and accompanying text.
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In search of a source of substantive standards by which to
measure the conduct of the defendants under section 7003,
the court looked to federal common law of nuisance.
Federal common law exists where "an overriding federal
interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision" creates the
need. 52 The existence of federal common law, however, is specifically limited by "new federal laws and new federal regulations [which] may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. '"" Thus, in assessing the availability of
federal common law of nuisance as a source of substantive
standards of liability under section 7003, the district court addressed the threshold issue of whether RCRA preempts federal common law. 54
Whether RCRA preempts federal common law of nuisance in the area of hazardous waste disposal "involves an assessment of the scope of the legislation and whether

. .

. [it]

addresses the problem formerly governed by federal common
law."' 55 The district court found that the legislative history of

RCRA supports the notion that Congress intended "to enter
[this] area which has traditionally been considered the sphere
of local responsibility."56 Secondly, the court observed that
Congress believed that it was enacting a comprehensive regulatory program 57 that, in conjunction with previously enacted
environmental legislation, formed a unified scheme for protecting the environment.58 Finally, the court noted that Congress mandated that an expert agency oversee the administration of the program.5 9 By analogy to Milwaukee 11,60 the court
52. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 103-07 & n.6 (1972).
53. Id. at 107.
54. Note that on appeal the circuit court made the same determination without
reaching the issue of whether federal common law is preempted. See infra notes 7178 and accompanying text.
55. 556 F. Supp. at 1315 (quoting Milwaukee I, 451 U.S. 304, 315 n.8 (1981)).
56. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6238, 6240).
57. Id. (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)).
58. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6240).
59. Id. (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)).
60. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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found that just as a regulatory scheme appeared best suited to
control water pollution,6" so too did a regulatory scheme appear best suited to control hazardous waste disposal.6 2 This
application of the Milwaukee II standard of preemption led
the district court to conclude that RCRA preempts federal
common law of nuisance in the area of solid and hazardous
waste disposal.6 3
In a footnote, the district court explored whether federal
common law of nuisance, though preempted, was nonetheless
available to provide substantive content to section 7003. Concluding that it was not available, the district court held that
the preemption of federal common law of nuisance is "com64
plete and total.
The district court examined United States v. Price (Price
I)5 which applied section 7003 substantively despite finding
that federal common law had been preempted.66 The district
court commented that "[a] serious anomaly results from that
determination. In essence, the RCRA preempts the federal
common law of nuisance as it relates to hazardous waste disposal. Nevertheless, section 7003, a provision within the
61. 556 F. Supp. at 1315 (citing 451 U.S. at 1325).
62. Id. But see Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 Nat.
Resources J. 249, 255-59 (1979) (criticizing RCRA's "cradle-to-grave" approach to
hazardous waste disposal).
63. 556 F. Supp. at 1315-16. Accord Price I, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J.
1981) ("The comprehensive nature of the schemes established by the RCRA and the
CERCLA require [this court] to conclude that, if federal common law ever governed
this type of activity, it has since been preempted by those statutes."), aff'd, 688 F.2d
204 (3d Cir. 1982). See infra note 113. Granting defendants' summary judgment motions on the federal common law nuisance claims, the district court examined the
threshold question of whether intrastate pollution is an appropriate area for the development of federal common law. The court held that intrastate pollution is not,
since coping with it neither requires a uniform rule of decision nor implicates important concerns of federalism. 523 F. Supp. at 1069. But see supra note 20.
64. 556 F. Supp. at 1316 n.29. Accord NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 837 n.13
(W.D. Mo. 1984) ("Federal common law governing hazardous waste disposal has been
preempted by subsequent Congressional legislation, RCRA and CERCLA. The Court
is therefore without recourse to federal common law in determining the defendants'
liability under section 7003....
).
65. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
66. Price I held that although dumping had ceased both the current and the
former owners of the landfill were "contributing to" the "disposal" of hazardous
wastes within the meaning of section 7003. 523 F. Supp. at 1070-74.
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RCRA, clings to this common law for its substance."6 7 The
district court noted that the "vague and imprecise" language
in section 7003 and the absence of any standards of liability in
section 7003 necessitated a search for substantive provisions. 8
The district court concluded, however, that Congress never intended for that search to begin, 9 and dismissed the
70
complaint.
B.

The Circuit Court's Decision

Holding that section 7003 functions both as a jurisdictional basis and as a source of substantive liability,7 1 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court opinion. Rejecting the district court's holding that federal common law had been entirely preempted, the Fourth
Circuit found that Congress incorporated federal common law
of nuisance in section 7003.72 The circuit court reasoned that
section 7003 substantive standards of liability might be found
in both section 7003 and federal common law of nuisance, and
concluded that federal common law substantive liability standards apply to section 7003 except to the extent that section
7003 expands upon those standards.7
In reaching its conclusion, the circuit court relied on the
following passage from a report on hazardous waste disposal
issued when the 1980 Amendments were being drafted:
[Sjection 7003 is essentially a codification of common law
67. 556 F. Supp. at 1316 n.29.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Although the district court opinion appears to leave section 7003 without any
substantive standards, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the district court opinion to
hold that section 7003 substantive standards may be found in the regulatory provisions of RCRA. Waste Industries, 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 167. Accord Diamond Shamrock, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1332
(N.D. Ohio May 29, 1981); Inmont, 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1434-35 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
72. 734 F.2d at 167. Accord United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1905, 1911-12 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984) (order denying motion to dismiss, and
denying in part and granting in part motion to strike). See infra notes 104-05 and
accompanying text. See also Inmont, 584 F. Supp. at 1434-35.
73. 734 F.2d at 167.
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public nuisance .... However, section 7003 should not
be construed solely with respect to the common law.
Some terms and concepts, such as persons "contributing
to" disposal resulting in a substantial endangerment, are
meant to be more liberal than their common law
7
counterparts. -

The circuit court found that this passage evidenced Congress'
intent to establish substantive standards of liability by incorporating and expanding upon the common law.7 5
By analogy to the Supreme Court's opinion in Milwaukee
I,/ some courts have found that the regulatory provisions of
RCRA and CERCLA are the sole source of substantive standards in the area of solid and hazardous waste disposal; that
RCRA and CERCLA entirely preempt federal common law in
this area, leaving no room for the application of common law
principles. 77 The Fourth Circuit opined that this analysis misinterprets the holding of Milwaukee II. The circuit court
found that Milwaukee II "disapproved only of the courts' use
of federal common law as a source for setting regulatory stan74. S.Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprintedin 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5019, 5023. See also Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report on Hazardous Waste Disposal,
H.R. Doc. No. 31, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1979) (Eckhardt Report). Subsequent
legislative history concerning previously enacted statutes merit considerable weight in
determining legislative intent. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
380-81 (1969); Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942).
See also NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 835 n.8 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Solvents Recovery,
496 F. Supp. 1127, 1140 n.18 (D.Conn. 1980); Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301,
1311 n.21, 1312 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (acknowledged weight to be given subsequent legislative history, but added that it should not be read blindly without regard for the context in which it was made or the legislation which resulted from the pronouncements). See supra note 36.
75. The Fourth Circuit explained:
Section 7003 is a congressional mandate that the former common law of nuisance, as applied to situations in which a risk of harm from solid or hazardous waste exists, shall include new terms and concepts which shall be developed in a liberal, not a restrictive, manner. This ensures that problems that
congress could not have anticipated when passing the Act will be dealt with
in a way minimizing the risk of harm to the environment and the public.
734 F.2d at 167.
76. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
77. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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dards independent of those established by a comprehensive
statutory scheme. [Milwaukee II] did not assail Congress'
prerogative to empower the courts to apply common-law principles as part of an ongoing regulatory scheme. ' 78
IV.

Analysis

Citing Midwest Solvent 7 9 the district court in Waste In-

dustries held that section 7003 is solely jurisdictional. Close
examination reveals that this pre-Milwaukee H decision,
though stating that section 7003 is solely jurisdictional, in fact
found substantive requirements in section 7003.
In Midwest Solvent the district court concluded that section 7003 merely confers jurisdiction upon the federal district
courts and standing upon EPA where the evidentiary tests of
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment are satisfied.80 What this district court characterized as an evidentiary test other federal courts have characterized as a substantive standard. This distinction is one only of
terms and not of substance. Whether the imminent and substantial endangerment language in section 7003 is deemed evidentiary or substantive, it must be interpreted and given effect. Thus, the circuit court's conclusion in Waste Industries
that section 7003 functions both as a jurisdictional basis and
as a source of substantive liability is supported not only by
those decisions which expressly hold that section 7003 is both
jurisdictional and substantive, but also by the leading decision
which, at first glance, appears to hold that section 7003 is
solely jurisdictional.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Waste Industries
concluded that federal common law standards of liability apply to section 7003 except to the extent that section 7003 expands upon those standards.8 ' Reasoning that Congress man78. 734 F.2d at 167 (emphasis in original).
79. 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980). See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying
text.
80. 484 F. Supp. at 143-44.
81. Waste Industries, 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984). See supra notes 71-78
and accompanying text.
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dated this result, the circuit court appears to take the position
that Congress empowered the courts to apply federal common
law principles to RCRA by codifying federal common law in
section 7003.
It is suggested that the circuit court reached the correct
result but that the court's analysis is inconsistent with established legal principles. Whether the federal courts may apply
federal common law to section 7003 depends not upon
whether Congress mandated this result by codifying federal
common law in section 7003, but whether that section speaks
directly to issues which previously were governed by federal
82
common law.
Federal common law exists and is resorted to as a necessary expedient whenever a court is compelled to answer federal questions which cannot be answered from federal statutes
alone. 83 When Congress speaks directly to a question previously governed by a decision based upon federal common law,
the need for such an unusual exercise of judicial legislation by
the federal courts disappears.8 4 This principle is exemplified
in Mobil Oil Corp. v.HigginbothaM. 5 In an action to recover
for wrongful death on the high seas, respondents sought to recover damage for their loss to society under general maritime
law, in addition to damages for pecuniary loss authorized by
federal statute. The Supreme Court held that the only damages respondents could recover were those authorized by statute: "The [Death on the High Seas] Act does not address
every issue of wrongful death law,. . . but when it does speak
directly to a question, the courts are not free to 'supplement'
Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes
meaningless."8 6
82. Congress "empowers" the courts to apply federal common law - not by codifying federal common law but by not speaking directly to a question. See Erie, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) ("Federal courts,
unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general
power to develop and apply their own rules of decisions.").
83. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314.

84. Id.
85. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
86. 436 U.S. at 625.
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Summarizing its decision in Mobil Oil, the Supreme
Court in Milwaukee II s8 noted that "the question was
whether the legislative scheme 'spoke directly to a question' in that case the question of damages - not whether Congress
'8 8
had affirmatively proscribed the use of federal common law.
Similarly, the threshold question in the instant case is not
whether Congress has mandated the use of federal common
law, but whether RCRA "spoke directly to a question." It is
apparent that Congress addressed the issue of who may be liable for suit under RCRA section 7003.89 Neither RCRA section 7003 nor any other provision of RCRA, however, addresses the issues of standard of liability and scope of
liability. 0 Since these issues "cannot be answered from federal statutes alone,"9 1 the federal courts may resort to federal
92
common law to fill the "interstitial gaps."
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Milwaukee H does
not absolutely preclude the application of nuisance principles
in the area of hazardous waste disposal aptly recognizes that
legislation does not exist in a vacuum. The circuit court inter87. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
88. 451 U.S. at 315.
89. RCRA section 7003 authorizes suit against "any person contributing to [the)
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal [of any solid waste or hazardous waste presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment]." 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a).
90. Whether a party is strictly liable for his actions or is liable only for his negligent conduct is the issue of standard of liability. Whether parties are jointly and
severally liable for their actions, and whether EPA must prove causation to recover
under RCRA, is the issue of scope of liability. For lack of a better word or phrase,
this note uses the phrase "standards of liability" to refer collectively to the issues
identified here.
91. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314.
92. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)
("[Tihe inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial
federal law making is a basic responsibility of the federal courts."), cited in Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314. See also 451 U.S. at 323 ("[Tlhere is no 'interstice' here to be
filled by federal common law .. ").In CERCLA section 107 Congress addressed the
issue of standard of liability. (It did not in that section address the issue of scope of
liability.) It may be, therefore, that the CERCLA section 107 standard of liability
should be applied to RCRA section 7003, and that the federal courts should resort to
federal common law to fill only the scope of liability gap in RCRA section 7003. See
infra notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
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preted Milwaukee H to preclude the judiciary from applying
federal common law principles as a source for setting standards independent of those established by statute, but not the
power of the judiciary to apply common law principles to a
statutory scheme.93 Thus, without reaching the issue of
whether RCRA preempts actions brought pursuant to federal
common law of nuisance, the Fourth Circuit held that federal
common law standards of liability apply to section 7003 to the
extent that section 7003 does not expand upon those
standards.
The conclusion that RCRA does not preclude the application of federal common law standards of liability to section
7003 finds support in Milwaukee II. Although the Supreme
Court's opinion is couched in language which refers to federal
common law standards established independently of a statutory scheme, 4 the Court's holding that federal common law
had been displaced may be limited to actions based on federal
common law. Indeed, in the opening paragraph of the opinion
the Court stated: "We granted certiorari to consider the effect
of [The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972] on the previously recognized cause of action."95
V.

CERCLA Section 106(a)

Like its RCRA counterpart, CERCLA's imminent hazard
provision, section 106(a), 6 has been applied by some federal
courts with reference to the standards of federal common law
of nuisance, and by others without any reference to federal
common law. Section 106(a) does not indicate who may be
sued or enjoined. Nor does section 106(a) specify what acts
would subject one to suit under that section. Thus, although
section 106(a) contains some substantive requirements,97 the
93. 734 F.2d at 167. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
94. 451 U.S. at 317 ("[I]t is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the
appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law." (emphasis
supplied)).
95. 451 U.S. at 307-08 (emphasis supplied).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). See supra note 18.
97. Section 106(a) contains the substantive requirement of an "imminent and
substantial endangerment." See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
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federal courts have found it necessary to refer to other sources
of substantive law when applying that section. Two decisions
hold that federal common law of nuisance principles apply to
section 106(a),98 and four hold that CERCLA section 10799 lia-

bility standards apply to section 106(a). 100
In United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp,'01 the
District Court of Minnesota found that the language in section 106(a) authorizing the federal district courts to grant
such relief as "the equities of the case may require" suggested
Supp. 1100, 1114 (D. Minn. 1982) (order denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp.
(OMC), 556 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D. II. 1982) (order denying motion to dismiss); United
States v. Price (Price III), 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1112-13 (D.N.J. 1983) (order denying
motion for summary judgment).
98. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982); United States v. Stringfellow,
20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1905 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984).
99. CERCLA section 107, which has no counterpart in RCRA states, in pertinent
part:
(a) [S]ubject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel... or a facility,
(2) any person who.. .owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person
who. . .arranged for disposal or treatment,
or.. .transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances. . .and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities... from which there is a release,
or a threatened release... of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred . . ;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred. . .; and
(C) damages for injury to. . .natural resources ....
(b) There shall be
no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable
who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party.... if the defendant establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care. . .and (b) he
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third
party. ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607.
100. OMC, 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Price III, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J.
1983); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co. (Conservation Chemical), 20 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1427 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co.,
578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. IMI.1984).
101. 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
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that equitable principles of federal common law of nuisance
may apply to determine an appropriate remedy.'0 2 This analysis was extended by the District Court for the Central District
of California in United States v. Stringfellow.10 3 The Stringfellow court also found that the language in section 106(a)
conferring jurisdiction upon the district courts evidenced Congress' intent that the federal courts' equitable powers be used,
including the power to remedy nuisances.10 4 The district court
went on to hold, however, that the scope of liability under section 106(a) should also be determined with reference to its
05
power under that section to grant an equitable remedy.
The first court to apply section 106(a) with reference to
section 107 was the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in United States v. Outboard Marine Corp. (OMC).' 6
The district court acknowledged that Congress might well
have intended that section 106(a) be applied with reference to
the standards of federal common law. In light of the "broad
pronouncements" of Milwaukee IP 07 in favor of preemption,
however, the district court was reluctant to rely upon federal
common law to interpret section 106(a). 0 8 The district court
stated that "Congress included this imminent hazard authority in its CERCLA design, and it should be given effect. . . .Whatever the source of the substantive law to be applied in a 106(a) action, it is most probable that those who
would be liable under Section 107 were intended to be liable
in an action under 106(a) for injunctive relief." 1 9
102. Id. at 1113 n.3.
103. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1905, 1910 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984) (There is no
role under section 106(a) for "joint and several liability to abate").
104. Id. Note that the district court applied the same reasoning to RCRA section
7003. Id. at 1911-12.
105. Even if traditional equitable principles of federal common law nuisance are
appropriate in determining a remedy under section 106(a), it does not necessarily
follow that they are appropriate in determining the standard or scope of liability
under that section. Indeed, if Congress intended only that the traditional equitable
remedies against nuisances are available under section 106(a), the substantive standards of liability of federal common law nuisance may not apply under that section.
106. 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
107. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
108. 556 F. Supp. at 56.
109. Id. at 57.
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The District Court of New Jersey in United States v.
Price (Price II1)110 found that Reilly Tar was inconsistent
with Milwaukee II, and concurred with the result reached in
OMC. Holding that the standards of liability set forth in section 107 apply under section 106(a), the district court listed
several additional reasons for applying those standards. The
district court opined that the section 107 "Liability" heading
denotes Congress' intent that this section define liability for
the entire Act."' Since section 107 does not contain any qualifying language and section 106(a) does not "discuss any independent standards of liability with respect to those parties
coming within its coverage," the district court concluded section 106(a) is dependent upon the substantive liability provisions in section 107." 2
OMC and Price III appear to find that the preemption
standard of Milwaukee II mandates the conclusion that
RCRA and CERCLA entirely preempt federal common law of
nuisance."" Waste Industries,"4 holding that Milwaukee II
does not preclude the application of federal common law principles to a statutory scheme, would appear to remove the barrier that both OMC and Price III saw in Milwaukee II to applying section 106(a) with reference to federal common law.
Section 107 substantive standards, however, may preclude the
application of federal common law principles to section
106(a). Still, federal common law of nuisance would apply to
110. 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983).
111. Id. at 113.
112. Id. Accord Conservation Chemical, 20 Env't. Rep. Cas. at 1430; A & F, 578
F. Supp. at 1257.
113. In CERCLA Congress expressed its intent concerning federal common law
in the Act's savings clause. In the FWPCA, a similar provision provides that "nothing
"§
in this section shall restrict any right... under any statute or common law ....
505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982) (emphasis supplied). In Milwaukee II, the Court
interpreted that section to mean that nothing in that section, rather than the entire
Act, should be read to preclude other remedies. 304 U.S. at 328-29. Thus, consistent
with section 505(e), the Court found that the entire Act preempted federal common
law. In CERCLA's savings clause, however, Congress broadened the language to provide that nothing in the entire Act preempts state or federal laws. 42 U.S.C. §
9652(d) (1982) (emphasis supplied). Thus, it may be argued that Congress did not
preempt actions based on federal common law nuisance by enacting CERCLA.
114. 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
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section 106(a) to the extent that section 107 leaves "interstitial gaps." 115
This appears to be the view of the District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois. In United States v. A & F
Materials Co." 6 the district court noted that there were compelling reasons for the development of a uniform federal common law in the area of hazardous waste disposal.'1 7 Accordingly, the district court determined that CERCLA imposes
joint and several liability. 1 8 Nevertheless, the district court
found that section 106(a) is dependent upon the liability provisions of section 107." 9
VI.

Conclusion

The vague and broadly worded imminent hazard provisions of RCRA and CERCLA have presented difficult questions of statutory construction for the federal courts. In
United States v. Waste Industries the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that federal common law standards of
liability apply to the imminent hazard provision in RCRA,
115. See supra note 92.
116. 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Il.. 1984).
117. First, CERCLA and RCRA taken together represent a substantial special federal interest in the abatement of toxic waste hazards.... Second,
CERCLA is a liability creating statute which relies on the federal courts for
implementation. The development of federal common law is appropriate to
fill in the gaps of a federal statute. . . . Third, a uniform rule of law will
prevent excessive dumping in states with more lenient laws. Finally, the federal government has an interest in preserving the integrity of the Superfund
and there is "no good reason why the United States' right to reimbursement
should be subjected to the needless uncertainty and subsequent delay occasioned by diversified local disposition when this matter is appropriate for
uniform national treatment."
A & F, 578 F. Supp. at 1255.
118. Id. at 1252-57. See also, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983); NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (Although both decisions hold that CERCLA section 107 imposes joint and
several liability where the injury is indivisible, Chem-Dyne concluded that the question calls for a uniform federal rule while NEPACCO found that it is not clear from
congressional statements whether federal or state common law should govern.); see
also Comment, Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under
Superfund, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1982).
119. A & F, 578 F. Supp at 1257.
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section 7003, except to the extent that section 7003 expands
upon those standards. The circuit court reasoned that Congress empowered the federal courts to apply nuisance principles by codifying federal common law in section 7003. It is
suggested that the application of federal common law to section 7003 depends not upon the incorporation of federal common law principles in section 7003 but on whether Congress
spoke directly to issues in section 7003 which formerly were
governed by federal common law of nuisance. Although the
issue of party liability is addressed in section 7003, neither in
section 7003 nor in any other provision of RCRA has Congress
spoken directly to the issues of standard of liability and scope
of liability. Since these issues cannot be answered from RCRA
alone, the federal courts may resort to federal common law to
fill those interstitial gaps. It is concluded that federal common
law principles also apply to the imminent hazard provision in
CERCLA, section 106(a), to the extent that it leaves interstitial gaps that are not filled by the other provisions of
CERCLA.
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois the Supreme Court held
that federal common law of nuisance had been displaced in
the area of water pollution control by the 1972 Amendments
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Federal courts,
bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, have been compelled to
interpret that decision and to apply its holding to RCRA and
CERCLA. Some federal courts, holding that RCRA and CERCLA entirely preempt federal common law of nuisance in the
area of solid and hazardous waste disposal, have been reluctant to apply federal common law principles to the imminent
hazard provisions of those Acts. The Fourth Circuit opinion in
Waste Industries is the first published decision to reconcile
Milwaukee If with the application of federal common law nuisance principles to RCRA section 7003. The Fourth Circuit
held that Milwaukee II does not preclude the application of
federal common law to a statutory scheme.
Paul L. Brozdowski
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